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I. Introduction
Section 2053(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides for the
deduction of certain expenses, indebtedness, and taxes from an estate's gross
value for the purpose of determining the net taxable value of an estate.'
Specifically, that section provides, "For purposes of the tax imposed by
section 2001, the value of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting
from the value of gross estate such amounts... for claims against the estate."2
The practical impact of this provision is that an estate, in computing net
taxable value, may deduct from its gross value the amount of any legally
enforceable claims of third parties, thereby reducing the estate's tax liability.
Section 2053(a) does not, however, specifically address the issue of
whether an estate should value such claims as of the date of death irrespective
of subsequent events, or whether postmortem events can affect this valuation.
Several complex problems arise due to the vagueness of the statute Because
the code is silent as to the issue of the timing of such valuations, executors
lack a definite rule governing the computation of the value of such deductions
and face the prospect that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will issue a
1. See I.R.C. § 2053(a) (2000) (permitting deductions for claims against estate in
determining estate's gross value). This section states in full:
General rule-For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the
taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate
such amounts(l) for funeral expenses, (2) for administration expenses, (3) for
claims against the estate, and (4) for unpaid mortgages on, or any indebtedness in
respect of, property where the value of the decedent's interest therein, undiminished
by such mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate, as are
allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the United
States, under which the estate is being administered.
Id.
2. Id.
3. See generally Anna Meresidis, Note, The LRC. § 2053(a)(3) Controversy: Should
Events After Death Affect the Value of Estate Tax Deductions for Claims Against the Estate?,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2705 (2002) (analyzing problems presented by vagueness of § 2053(aX3)
with respect to various types of claims typically asserted against estates and arguing in favor of
date-of-death valuation rule). Ms. Meresidis's note commences with a discussion of five
separate types of claims typically asserted against estates, id. at 2710-13, and then focuses on
application of the statute to definite claims, disputed claims, and contingent claims, id. at
2718-43. Although this Note briefly treats definite, disputed, and contingent claims in subpart
I.B, infra, it expands on Ms. Meresidis's note by providing a comprehensive analysis of the
differing treatment of the issue by the circuit courts, infra Part I, discussing the differences
between deduction valuation and claim validity, infra subpart MA, contrasting deductions for
claims with other estate deductions, infra subpart m.C, and engaging in a comparative analysis
of the role of postmortem events in valuing the assets of an estate, infra Part IV.
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notice of deficiency should postmortem events alter the value of claims that
existed as of the date of death.
The following illustration demonstrates the potential problems that arise
as a result of the code's failure to address this issue.4 In 2002, Jane Doe
makes a gift of stock in the family business to her son, John Doe. Jane
determines that the value of the stock is $2,000,000 at the time of the gift, and
she pays gift taxes in the amount of $435,000.' Three years later, in 2005,
Jane dies and her estate is worth $3,000,000. Shortly after her death, the IRS
initiates an investigation into the valuation of the gift she made to her son.
The IRS determines that the stock she gifted was in fact worth $3,000,000
and, as a result, that her tax liability on the 2002 gift was actually $930,000.6
Assume for the purposes of this illustration that the IRS cannot issue a notice
of deficiency against Jane's estate because the statute of limitations has run.
Instead, the IRS asserts liability against John Doe for the $495,000 shortfall7
pursuant to § 6324 of the tax code, which shifts liability for unpaid gift taxes
to the donee when the liability becomes unenforceable as against the donor by
reason of lapse of time.' In response, John Doe promptly files an action in
probate court asserting a claim against Jane's estate for the $495,000 defi-
ciency. Jane's estate consequently deducts $495,000 from the gross value of
the estate pursuant to John's claim, resulting in an estate tax liability of
$1,037,500. 9
4. The author derived the factual basis for this illustration from a leading Eleventh
Circuit case. See Estate of O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265, 1273 (1lth Cir. 2001)
(upholding estate's deduction based on date-of-death valuation of claim irrespective of postmor-
tem events that altered this valuation).
5. Pursuant to § 2001(c), the tentative tax on a gift of $2,000,000 made in 2002 is
$780,800. I.R.C. § 2001(c) (West Supp. 2002). Pursuant to § 2010(c), this amount is reduced
by a credit equal to the tentative tax on $1,000,000. Id. § 2010(c). The tentative tax on
$1,000,000 is $345,800. Id. § 2001(c). Subtracting $345,800 from $780,800 results in a gift
tax liability of $435,000.
6. Pursuant to § 2001(c), the tentative tax on a gift of $3,000,000 made in 2002 is
$1,275,800. Id. § 2001(c). Pursuant to § 2010(c), this amount is reduced by a credit equal to
the tentative tax on $1,000,000. Id. § 2010(c). The tentative tax on $1,000,000 is $345,800.
Id. § 2001(c). Subtracting $345,800 from $1,275,800 results in a gift tax liability of $930,000.
7. The shortfall is the difference between the $435,000 gift tax Jane paid (based on
Jane's gift valuation of $2,000,000) and the $930,000 actually due (based on the IRS gift
valuation of $3,000,000).
8. See I.R.C. § 6324(aX2) (2000) (imposing gift tax liability on transferees).
9. Determining Jane's estate tax liability involves a four-step process. The first step is
to compute the value of Jane's taxable estate. Her taxable estate is determined by subtracting
$495,000 (the value of John's claim) from $3,000,000 (her gross estate at death). Id.
§ 2053(aX3). This results in a taxable estate of $2,505,000. The second step is to add the value
of the taxable estate to the value of adjusted taxable gifts. Pursuant to § 2001(bXl), Jane's
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One year later, John and the IRS reach a settlement valuing the gifted
stock at $2,500,000. This valuation would have resulted in a gift tax liability
of $680,000.10 Thus the value of John's claim after the settlement decreases
to $245,000.11 Herein lies the problem. If Jane's estate may rely on the date-
of-death valuation of the claim, the $495,000 deduction remains intact, and
the estate's tax liability of $1,037,500 does not change. However, if postmor-
tem events, like John's settlement with the IRS, can affect the value of deduc-
tions for claims, then Jane's estate must amend the value of the deduction
from $495,000 to $245,000, and as a result the estate's tax liability will
increase to $1,163,300.12 This represents a $125,800 increase in tax liability
for Jane's estate. 3
The previous illustration underscores the need for legislative or judicial
guidance in determining the timing of valuation of deductions for claims
against estates. When a postmortem event reduces the value of a claim for
which an estate initially took a deduction, the executor will argue that the
date-of-death valuation should govern. Conversely, when a postmortem event
increases the value of such a claim, the executor will seek to increase the
executor must add the value of Jane's taxable estate at her death, $2,505,000, to the value of
adjusted taxable gifts, $2,000,000, resulting in an amount of $4,505,000, which is subject to tax.
Id. § 2001(bX1). The third step is to calculate the tentative tax on $4,505,000, which, pursuant
to § 2001(c), is $2,028,300. Id. § 2001(c). This tentative tax is reduced by the aggregate
amount of gift tax Jane already paid. Id. § 2001(bX2). Subtracting the $435,000 Jane already
paid results in a tentative tax of $1,593,300. The fourth step is to apply the unified credit
allowable under § 2010 to this tentative tax. The applicable credit for an estate of a decedent
dying in 2005 is the tentative tax on $1,500,000. Id. § 2010(c). The tentative tax on
$1,500,000 is $555,800. Id. § 2001(c). Subtracting the $555,000 credit from the tentative tax
of $1,593,300 results in a tax liability for Jane's estate in the amount of $1,037,500.
10. Pursuant to § 2001(c), the tentative tax on a gift of $2,500,000 made in 2002 is
$1,025,800. Id. § 2001(c). Pursuant to § 2010(c), this amount is reduced by a credit equal to
the tentative tax on $1,000,000. Id. § 2010(c). The tentative tax on $1,000,000 is $345,800.
Id. § 2001(c). Subtracting $345,800 from $1,025,800 results in a gift tax liability of $680,000.
11. The $245,000 claim value represents the difference between the $435,000 gift tax
Jane paid (based on Jane's gift valuation of $2,000,000) and the $680,000 actually due (based
on the $2,500,000 settlement valuation).
12. Deducting $245,000 (the amended value of the allowable § 2053(aX3) deduction)
from $3,000,000 (Jane's gross estate), and then adding to this amount the value of Jane's
adjusted taxable gifts ($2,000,000), yields an amount of $4,755,000, which is subject to tax.
See supra note 9 (explaining calculation of taxable estate). The tentative tax on $4,755,000 is
$2,153,300. I.R.C. § 2001(c) (West Supp. 2002). This tax is reduced by the $435,000 gift tax
Jane already paid, resulting in a tentative tax of $1,718,300. Id. § 2001(bX2). Applying the
$555,800 unified credit to the tentative tax of $1,718,300 results in a tax liability for Jane's
estate in the amount of $1,163,300. Id. § 2010(c).
13. The $125,800 of tax liability represents the difference between the initial tax liability
of $1,037,500 and the revised tax liability of $1,163,300.
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amount of the estate's deduction for this claim. Without a hard and fast rule
governing the proper role of postmortem events in valuing deductions for
claims, the potential for litigation of the issue is limitless.
As one commentator eloquently observed, this issue "lies at the intersec-
tion of the two inevitables, death and taxes."'4 Executors lack guidance as to
whether they may rely on deductions for claims valued as of the date of death,
or whether postmortem events can play a role in altering the valuation of these
deductions. 5 Furthermore, this lack of guidance continues to result in litiga-
tion that drains precious IRS resources that are already severely strained. 6
Unfortunately, neither the courts nor Congress have succeeded in clear-
ing these muddy waters. In the courts, a distinct circuit split has evolved as
to which rule applies, with four circuits holding that estates should value
deductions for claims as of the date of death irrespective of postmortem
events 7 and with two circuits holding that postmortem events can alter the
valuation of such deductions."8 The statutes and administrative regulations
provide even less guidance as to which rule to apply. The language of
§ 2053(a) is completely devoid of reference to the proper date on which to
value claims deductions.' 9 Furthermore, the only relevant treasury regulations
concerning valuation of deductions for claims are arguably contradictory.20
14. Gary Young, Death, Taxes, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, NAT. L.J., Aug. 20, 2001,
atB6.
15. See Robert E. Madden & Lisa H.R. Hayes, Subsequent Litigation Cannot Alter
Amount of Claim Deducted, 28 EST. PLAN. 548, 550 (2001) (observing that "issue of when and
how to value a claim for estate tax purposes is obviously not settled" and cautioning tax
practitioners to "be ready to defend their position if challenged").
16. See Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS Lacks Resources It Needs, Departing Commissioner
Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2002, at El (noting that tight budgets and a mandate to improve
technology and customer service have curtailed hiring of "revenue agents or other professionals
who have the training and experience necessary to find unreported income and overstated
deductions").
17. See, e.g., Estate of O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265,1276-77 (1 th Cir. 2001)
(refusing to consider postmortem events in valuing deductions for claims against estates); Estate
of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254, 1263 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Estate of Smith v.
Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 526 (5th Cir. 1999) (same), Estate of Van Home v. Comm'r, 720 F.2d
1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1257 (9th Cir.
1982) (same).
18. See, e.g., Estate of Sachs v. Comm'r, 856 F.2d 1158,1163 (8th Cir. 1988) (ruling that
postmortem events do play role in valuation of deductions for claims against estates); Comm'r
v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1960) (same); Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233,
236 (8th Cir. 1929) (same).
19. See I.R.C. § 2053(aX3) (2000) (lacking any reference to timing of valuation of
deductions for claims).
20. See Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting ambiguity
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Seeming to support a rule in favor of consideration of postmortem events,
Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-1(b)(3) permits a deduction for a claim
"though its exact amount is not then known, provided it is ascertainable with
reasonable certainty, and will be paid.""1 This regulation arguably requires
courts to consider postmortem events when the exact value of a claim is not
ascertainable upon death.22 Conversely, Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-4
permits a deduction for "personal obligations of the decedent existing at the
time of his death."23 This temporal reference to "time of [ death" arguably
favors a firm date-of-death valuation rule.24
It is probable that the Supreme Court will eventually grant certiorari to
provide guidance as to which rule applies.25 With the circuit courts divided
over which rule to apply, nothing short of a legislative amendment or a decree
from the Supreme Court will put an end to the doctrinal disarray of the law as
it exists in its present form. There are two distinct policy concerns that
mandate decisive resolution of this issue. First, there is a strong public policy
of regulations).
21. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(bX3) (as amended in 1972) (governing use of estimated
values). This section reads as follows:
Estimated amounts. An item may be entered on the return for deduction though its
exact amount is not then known, provided it is ascertainable with reasonable
certainty, and will be paid. No deduction may be taken upon the basis of a vague
or uncertain estimate. If the amount of a liability was not ascertainable at the time
of final audit of the return by the district director and, as a consequence, it was not
allowed as a deduction in the audit, and subsequently the amount of the liability is
ascertained, relief may be sought by a petition to the Tax Court or a claim for
refund as provided by sections 6213(a) and 6511, respectively.
Id.
22. See Smith, 198 F.3d at 521 (explaining argument that favors consideration of
postmortem events unless estate can prove that claim is "reasonably certain" and "will be paid").
23. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958). This section states in relevant part:
The amounts that may be deducted as claims against a decedent's estate are such
only as represent personal obligations of the decedent existing at the time of his
death, whether or not then matured, and interest thereon which had accrued at the
time of death. Only interest accrued at the date of the decedent's death is allowable
even though the executor elects the alternate valuation method under section 2032.
Only claims enforceable against the decedent's estate may be deducted.
Id.
24. See Smith, 198 F.3d at 521 (explaining argument that regulation's temporal reference
to time of death calls for date-of-death valuation standard).
25. See Jerry A. Kasner, Postdeath Events and Supreme Court Review, 93 TAX NOTES
958, 960 (2001) ("It appears the Supreme Court may finally decide this issue one day."). But
see infra note 283 (discussing repeal of estate tax, and noting that the Supreme Court will likely
postpone treatment of the issue until Congress determines whether to make the repeal perma-
nent).
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concern for a rule that avoids uncertainty and delay in estate administration.26
Second, there is a need to divine Congress's intent in drafting § 2053(a) so as
to avoid windfall awards to estates, while at the same time preserving the
federal government's interest in encouraging certain deductions.27
This Note attempts to shed light on these policy concerns by analyzing
the evolution of the doctrinal disarray of the law as it exists today and by
discussing several discrete components of the debate that should factor into
a determination of whether postmortem events should play a role in valuing
deductions for claims against estates. Part II of this Note traces the historical
evolution of the split between the circuits and evaluates the recent entry of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits into the debate.
Part III of this Note discusses three components of the debate that should
weigh heavily on the courts' resolution of this issue. These components
include: 1) the distinction between valuation and validity of claims; 2) the
distinction between certain claims and those that are contested or contingent;
and 3) the distinction between deductions for claims and deductions for other
estate expenses, such as funeral and administrative expenses. Part IV of this
Note provides a comparative analysis of statutory and judicial treatment of
using hindsight in valuing assets for purposes of determining the value of the
gross estate. This analysis focuses on the following: 1) the express language
of the code and treasury regulations relating to the timing of such valuation,
2) the problems inherent in using hindsight to determine fair market value, and
3) the congressional carve-out of an alternate valuation date under § 2032. In
conclusion, Part V reiterates the need for resolution of the debate in light of
the public policy concerns involved.
I. Evolution of the Circuit Split
Crucial to an understanding of the policy concerns underlying the need
for resolution of this issue is an understanding of the evolution of the debate
itself. Justice Holmes laid the foundation for the debate in 1929 by refusing
to consider postmortem events in valuing a charitable deduction.2 Later that
same year the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declined the
opportunity to extend Holmes's reasoning to the valuation of a deduction for
26. See Estate of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2001)
(suggesting that date-of-death valuation rule "alleviates the uncertainty and delay in estate
administration which may result if events occurring months or even years after a decedent's
death could be considered in valuing a claim against the estate").
27. See infra note 185 and accompanying text (suggesting that date-of-death valuation
results in windfalls to estates).
28. See Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1929) (refusing to
consider postmortem events in valuing deduction for charitable contribution).
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a claim against an estate.29 From these two divergent decisions two camps
emerged: one favoring the consideration of postmortem events in valuing
deductions for claims against estates and another favoring a date-of-death
valuation rule. At present, the courts seem to be leaning in favor of a date-of-
death valuation rule, with four circuits favoring such an interpretation and
only two opposing it.30
The remainder of Part H analyzes the evolution of this circuit split. This
analysis commences with a discussion of the Holmes opinion that gave rise
to the debate. The analysis continues by discussing the resulting divergence
in the circuits regarding the role of postmortem events in valuing deductions
for claims. The analysis concludes with a discussion of the recent entry of the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits into the debate in 2001.
A. Holmes Sets the Stage
In Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States,31 Justice Holmes set the stage for the
current debate over the timing of the valuation of deductions of claims against
estates.32 In Ithaca Trust, the testator left a will creating a trust with his widow
and the petitioner as trustees.3" The will created an estate for life in the testa-
tor's widow such that she had "authority to use from the principal any sum
'that may be necessary to suitably maintain her in as much comfort as she now
enjoys."'I Furthermore, the will stipulated that upon the widow's death the
remainder should go to several charities. Six months after the testator's
death, the widow died. 6
The executor of the decedent's estate deducted the value of the charitable
bequests pursuant to Section 403(a)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1919.3' The
29. See Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233, 236 (8th Cir. 1929) (declining opportunity to
extend Ithaca Trust rule to deductions for claims against estates).
30. See Young, supra note 14, at B6 (noting that Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits favor date-of-death valuation rule, while Second and Eighth Circuits oppose this rule).
31. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
32. See id. at 154-55 (holding that estate may deduct value of charitable remainder from
life estate based on estimated value of this remainder computed as of date of death).




37. Section 403(aX3) of the Revenue Act of 1919 is a predecessor of I.R.C. § 2055(aX2),
which provides for a deduction for bequests to charitable organizations. See Revenue Act of
1919, ch. 18, § 403(aX3), 40 Stat. 1057, 1098 (current version at I.R.C. § 2055(aX2) (2000))
(providing for deduction of "all bequests, legacies, devises, or gifts, to or for the use of... any
corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
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Government argued that the value of the deduction for the charitable bequests
should be the actuarially determined value of those bequests as of the date of
the testator's death.' The petitioner argued that because the widow died
before the estate filed the return, the actual value of the bequests was known,
and therefore the actual value of the bequests should determine the allowable
deduction. 9 Justice Holmes agreed with the Government and held that the
actuarially determined value of the bequests as of the testator's date of death
should dictate the allowable deduction for the bequests irrespective of events
occurring subsequent to the testator's death.4"
At the core of Holmes's reasoning was the principle that facts ascertained
after the occurrence of a taxable event play no role in influencing the taxable
value of that event." He stated, "The first impression is that it is absurd to
resort to statistical probabilities when you know the fact. But this is due to
inaccurate thinking. The estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of the
testator's death."42 He further stated, "Tempting as it is to correct uncertain
probabilities by the now certain fact, we are of opinion that it cannot be
done.1 43  One commentator argued that the driving force behind Holmes's
reasoning was that the alternative of requiring absolute certainty in computing
the valuation of charitable deductions would completely undermine and
discourage such deductions:
A call for absolute certainty would doom the charitable deduction in all
cases, for there is no such thing. Even ifthe estate is left outright to charity,
it is always possible that something might happen to defeat charity's
interest-at worst, the estate might be lost through investment reverses.
The only question in Ithaca Trust was the degree of uncertainty that the
system could reasonably tolerate.M
educational purposes"). Sections 664 and 2055(e) now control the valuation of charitable
remainder gifts. See I.R.C. § 664 (2000) (governing charitable remainder trusts); id. § 2055(e)
(limiting deduction of charitable remainder gifts in certain circumstances).
38. See Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 152 ("The findings of fact as to the... [actuarial value
of the widow's life estate] took the amount of the residuary bequest out of the field of mere
speculation and afforded a reasonable basis for determining its value and amount.").
39. Id. Because the widow died only six months after the testator, the actual value of the
bequests was greater than their actuarially determined present value as of the date of death. The
estate sought to use the actual value of the bequests because it would produce a more favorable
deduction. Id.
40. Id. at 155.
41. See id. (holding that "the value of the thing to be taxed must be estimated as of the
time when the act is done" even though subsequent events might alter the original valuation).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Leo L. Schmolka, Income Taxation of Charitable Remainder Trusts and Decedents'
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Evidently, Holmes felt that the system could reasonably tolerate a substantial
degree of uncertainty in the interest of encouraging charitable deductions.4"
Justice Holmes rationalized his decision by painting the degree of uncer-
tainty of the future value of the charitable bequests in a favorable light. He
asserted:
The principal that could be used was only so much as might be necessary
to continue the comfort then enjoyed [by the widow]. The standard was
fixed in fact and capable of being stated in definite terms of money. It was
not left to the widow's discretion. The income of the estate at the death of
the testator, and even after debts and specific legacies had been paid, was
more than sufficient to maintain the widow as required. There was no
uncertainty appreciably greater than the general uncertainty that attends
human affairs.46
The facility with which Holmes found that it is possible to determine the
present value of a deduction based on uncertain future events exemplifies how
strongly he favored a firm date-of-death valuation rule. The accepted philoso-
phy underlying use of a date-of-death valuation of charitable deductions for
estate tax purposes is that "a decedent's philanthropy (and the estate's deduc-"
tion) should be measured at the time of the decedent's death and not be af-
fected by valuation changes that result from either a mere lapse of time or
postmortem contingencies."'47 Any departure from a date-of-death valuation
rule with regard to charitable deductions would necessarily result in fluctuat-
ing valuations that do not truly reflect the philanthropic intent of the decedent
and might ultimately discourage such contributions."
Although Justice Holmes closed the door on the potential of postmortem
events affecting the valuation of deductions for charitable contributions, he did
not expressly extend his reasoning in the Ithaca Trust case to any other deduc-
tions from the taxable estate.49 By narrowly applying the date-of-death valua-
tion rule, he left unanswered the question of whether his reasoning should
apply to deductions for claims against estates. Those courts that apply the
Estates: Sixty-Six Years ofAstigmatism, 40 TAX L. REV. 1,21-22 (1984).
45. See Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155 (finding it unnecessary to "correct uncertain
possibilities by the now certain fact").
46. Id. at 154.
47. RicHAiRB. STEPHENSETAL.,FEDERALESTATEANDiIFrTAxATION 5.05[3][b] (7th
ed. 1997).
48. See supra text accompanying note 44 (commenting that certainty in valuation would
discourage charitable deductions).
49. See Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 154-55 (holding that postmortem events do not play a
role in valuation of charitable deductions, but failing to address whether this rule applies to
other estate deductions).
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Ithaca Trust rule to claims do so under the premise that there is a logical
relationship between deductions for claims and deductions for charitable
contributions; those that reject the Ithaca Trust rule with respect to claims
dismiss this premise and refuse to extend Holmes's opinion beyond the realm
of deductions for charitable contributions.'0
B. Circuit Courts Diverge
The debate over the applicability of Holmes's rule beyond charitable
deductions began only three months after Ithaca Trust when the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided Jacobs v. Commissioner." In Jacobs,
a husband and wife executed an antenuptial contract under which the wife was
to receive $75,000 from the husband's estate upon his death.52 However, the
husband included in his will a provision granting the wife the option of forego-
ing the $75,000 payment in favor of net income for life from $250,000 of her
husband's estate.53 The widow exercised this income option after her hus-
band's death.54 Nevertheless, the executor of the decedent's estate deducted
$75,000 from the gross value of the estate.55
The estate asserted that the $75,000 deduction represented the value of a
valid and enforceable claim by the widow against the estate as of the dece-
dent's date of death, despite the widow's subsequent choice to exercise the
income option. 6 The estate argued that pursuant to Ithaca Trust the value of
the claim as it existed on the date of death should dictate the allowable deduc-
tion without regard to events occurring subsequent to death that alter this
valuation. 7 The Government argued that because the widow exercised the
income option, she effectively cancelled her claim to the $75,000 payment. 58
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Government and upheld the Commis-
sioner's disallowance of this deduction.59 In response to the estate's argument
50. See John Zimmerman, ClaimsAgainst the Estate: A ContinuingControversy, 10 TAX
MGMr. EST., GUMts, & TR. J. 65, 66 (1985) (noting that courts rejecting date-of-death valuation
distinguish Ithaca Trust because it involved deduction for charitable contribution).
51. See Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233,236 (8th Cir. 1929) (ruling that postdeath events
can play role in valuing deductions for claims).




56. Id. at 234.
57. Id. at 236.
58. See id. at 234 (stating that "when the widow elected to accept the provision made for
her in the will, her election 'canceled ... the claim arising out of the antenuptial contract').
59. Id. at 236.
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that Ithaca Trust called for a date-of-death valuation for all allowable estate
deductions, the Jacobs court refused to extend application of Holmes's opinion
beyond the realm of charitable deductions.'e The court noted that Ithaca Trust
involved a dispute over a charitable deduction pursuant to § 403 (a)(3) of the
Revenue Act of 1919,' while the dispute in Jacobs involved a deduction
pursuant to § 403(a)(1) ofthe Revenue Act of 1921,62 relating to claims against
an estate.63 Thus, the court foreclosed the use of Ithaca Trust, at least in the
Eighth Circuit, as a viable argument supporting a date-of-death valuation for
claims against estates.'
The Jacobs court's refusal to apply Ithaca Trust beyond the realm of
charitable deductions laid the foundation for the circuit split that remains
today. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits sub-
scribe to the Jacobs reasoning and consider postmortem events in determining
valuation of deductions for claims.6" The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits are loyal to Holmes's reasoning in Ithaca Trust and refuse
to consider postmortem events in determining the value of deductions for
claims." In 2001, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits sided with the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits in refusing to consider
60. Id.
61. Section 403(aX3) of the Revenue Act of 1919 is a predecessor of I.R.C. § 2055(aX2),
which provides for a deduction for bequests to charitable organizations. See Revenue Act of
1919, ch. 18, § 403(aX3), 40 Stat. 1057, 1098 (current version at I.R.C. § 2055(aX2) (2000))
(providing for deduction of "all bequests, legacies, devises, or gifts, to or for the use of... any
corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes").
62. Section 403(aXI) of the Revenue Act of 1921 is a predecessor of I.R.C.
§ 2053(aXl)-(4), which provides for a deduction for funeral and administration expenses,
claims, and unpaid mortgages. See RevenueAct of 1921, ch.136, § 403(aX), 42 Stat. 227,279
(current version at I.R.C. § 2053(aXl)-(4) (2000)) (providing for deduction of "such amounts
for funeral expenses, administration expenses, claims against the estate, unpaid mortgages...
[and] losses incurred during the settlement of the estate arising from... casualty, or from
theft").
63. Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233, 236 (8th Cir. 1929).
64. See Estate of Sachs v. Comm'r, 856 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1988) (reaffirming
Eight Circuit's support of rule announced in Jacobs, stating "[i]n this Circuit, however, the
date-of-death principle of valuation does not apply to claims against the estate deducted under
§ 2053(aX3)").
65. See id. (rejecting date-of-death valuation outside the realm of charitable bequests);
Comm'r v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372,375 (2d Cir. 1960) (same).
66. See Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 526 (5th Cir. 1999) (supporting date-
of-death valuation); Estate of Van Home v. Comm'r, 720 F.2d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1983)
(same); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1257 (9th Cir. 1982) (same).
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postmortem events. 7 A brief discussion of the leading cases from each circuit
follows.
The leading Eighth Circuit case, following the directives of the Jacobs
court in refusing to apply Ithaca Trust, is Estate of Sachs v. Commissioner.'
In Sachs, the decedent gifted stock prior to his death to three trusts benefitting
his grandchildren subject to a condition that the donees pay the gift tax.69
After the death of the decedent, the appellee filed an estate tax return includ-
ing the net value of the gifts in the gross value of the estate pursuant to
§ 2035(a), which requires inclusion in the estate's gross value of any gifts
made by the decedent within three years prior to death.70 Shortly after the
appellee filed the return, however, another Eighth Circuit case held that
estates must also include in their gross value the full amount of any gift tax,
whether paid by the donor or by the donee.7" As a result, the appellee paid the
additional income tax arising from the payment of the gift tax by the donees
and deducted this amount as a claim against the estate pursuant to
§ 2053(a)(3)." Two years later, a provision in the Tax Reform Act of 1984
resulted in forgiveness of the additional tax liability."
The appellee argued that pursuant to Ithaca Trust, the value of the claim
as of the date of death should control for purposes of valuing the estate's
deduction even though this claim ceased to exist by reason of statutory amend-
ment after the death of the decedent. 74 The Government argued that because
the statutory amendment relieved the estate of the obligation to satisfy the
claim, the deduction for the claim was invalid. The court agreed with the
Government and held invalid the appellee's initial § 2053(a)(3) deduction,
reasoning that when an estate's tax liability ceases to exist, so too does its
right to take a deduction for this liability.76
67. See Estate of O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2001)
(supporting date-of-death valuation); Estate of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254, 1263
(10th Cir. 2001) (same).
68. See Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1163 (ruling that postdeath events play role in valuation).
69. Id.at 1159.
70. Id.
71. See Diedrich v. Comm'r, 643 F.2d 499, 505 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that payment
of gift tax by donees produces taxable income for donor).
72. Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1159.
73. Id.; see Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1026(a), 98 Stat. 494, 1031
(excluding from donor's gross income amounts attributable to donee's payment of gift tax).
74. Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1160.
75. Id.at1159-60.
76. Id. at 1160.
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The Sachs court relied heavily on the principles established in Jacobs,
reaffirming that "[t]he date-of-death valuation principle adopted in Ithaca
Trust is not universally applicable to other tax contexts."77 The court found
even more support for considering the postmortem event in this case than in
Jacobs because the event was an act of Congress that retroactively extin-
guished the tax liability and therefore the claim."8 Thus, Sachs established
that the Eighth Circuit would remain firmly entrenched in its rejection of
Ithaca Trust and in its support for the consideration of postmortem events in
valuing deductions for claims against estates, except in cases of charitable
bequests.
In Commissioner v. Estate ofShively,79 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit joined the Jacobs bandwagon and rejected date-of-death
valuation principles." In Shively, a husband and wife entered into a separa-
tion agreement pursuant to which the husband (and his estate upon his death)
would pay the wife $40 per week after their son turned twenty-one and until
her remarriage.'" The husband died in June of 1952, and the estate made
payments until July of 1953, when the decedent's widow remarried."2 The
estate tax return filed by the respondent, also in July of 1953, included a
deduction of $27,058.30, the actuarial present value as of the date of death of
future payments due to the widow. 3 The actual value of payments made by
the estate to the widow prior to her remarriage was only $2,079.96.4
The respondent argued that pursuant to Ithaca Trust, the actuarially
determined present value of the payments to the widow as of the date of death
should dictate the allowable deduction.8 The Government argued that be-
cause the widow remarried prior to the filing of the estate return, the actual
value of the payments due to the widow was known, and therefore the actual
value of the payments should determine the allowable deduction. 6 The court
agreed with the Government, holding that the respondent could deduct no
77. Id. at 1162.
78. Id. at 1162-63.
79. Comm'r v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372,375 (2d Cir. 1960).
80. See id. (ruling that postmortem events do play role in valuation of deductions for
claims against estates).
81. Id. at 373.
82. Id.
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more than the actual amount paid to the widow while the estate was in probate
and prior to her remarriage."7
However, the court's reasoning hinged not on an interpretation of Ithaca
Trust, but rather onthe language of§ 812(b)(3), a predecessor to § 2053(a)(3),
which permitted deductions for claims against an estate only to the extent that
such claims are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction under which the
administration of the estate takes place."8 Pursuant to Connecticut law, had
the decedent's widow sought to enforce a claim for delinquent alimony
payments, she would have been limited to the actual sum of alimony payments
due and could not have sought to recover the actuarially determined present
value of such payments as of the date of death. 9 As a result, the court held
that if the actual amount of the claim is determinable pursuant to state law
prior to the filing of the tax return by the estate, then the "estate may obtain
under Section 812(b)(3) no greater deduction than the established sum,
irrespective of whether this amount is established through events occurring
before or after the decedent's death."" Thus, although the holding hinged on
state law, Shively firmly established the Second Circuit's stance in favor of
consideration of postmortem events in determining estate valuation.
However, in sharp contrast to the position of the Second and Eighth
Circuits, is the strong support for a date-of-death valuation rule in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The two leading cases, Propstra v.
United States91 and Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, I manifest this
circuit's refusal to consider postmortem events in determining deduction
valuations.
93
In Propstra, pursuant to § 2053(a)(3), the executrix of the decedent's
estate deducted $202,423.05-the amount of liens outstanding as of the date
87. Id. at 375.
88. Id. at 374; see Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 3, § 812(b), 53 Stat. 1, 123 (current version
at I.R.C. § 2053(a) (2000)) (permitting deductions for claims against estates only "as are
allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the United States, under
which the estate is being administered"). Section 2053(aX3) contains identical language. I.R.C.
§ 2053(aX3) (2000).
89. See Shively, 276 F.2d at 374 (observing that pursuant to "Connecticut law if she had
received no support payments for the period subsequent to Shively's death and had been forced
to prove her claim against the estate she would have been limited at the time the estate tax return
was filed to payments due her prior to her remarriage").
90. Id. at375.
91. Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1981).
92. Estate of Van Home v. Comm'r, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983).
93. See id. at 1117 (refusing to consider postmortem events in valuing deductions for
claims against estates); Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1257 (same).
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of death against the decedent's one-half ownership share of real property.94
Almost two years later, the estate settled the claims with the lienholder in the
amount of $134,826.23. 95 Shortly thereafter, the Commissioner assessed a
deficiency against the estate, arguing that the estate could only deduct the
amount actually paid to discharge the liens.96 The appellee argued that the
value of the claim as of the date of death should dictate the allowable deduc-
tion despite the postdeath settlement.'
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the appellee and held valid the date-of-
death valuation of the deduction for the lien claims, even though the amount
actually paid by the estate in settlement of the claims was less than the amount
of the deduction.9 Relying on Ithaca Trust and legislative history, the court
held that postmortem events are irrelevant in determining the value of deduc-
tions for claims that are certain and enforceable at death.99 The court deter-
mined that the lien claims were certain and enforceable as of the date of death
and, therefore, held that the date-of-death valuation of the deductions for these
claims controlled.1"' However, the court also suggested that postmortem
events do play a role in valuation when such claims are contested or contin-
gent.101
In Van Home, a husband and wife entered into a divorce agreement
stipulating that the wife or her estate would make monthly spousal support
payments of $5,000 to the husband for life.1 2 The wife's estate deducted
$596,386.58 from gross value, which represented the actuarial present value
of future payments to the surviving ex-husband.103 The decedent's ex-husband
died seven months after the decedent, having received only $35,000 in support
payments.1
°4
94. Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1250.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1249.
98. Id. at 1257.
99. Id. at 1254-56.
100. Id. at 1254.
101. See id. at 1253 ("The law is clear that post-death events are relevant when computing
the deduction to be taken for disputed or contingent claims."). In arriving at this conclusion,
the court referred to an earlier, identical version of Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(bX3) that stated,
"No deduction may be taken on the basis of a vague or uncertain estimate." Tress. Reg.
§ 20.2053-1(bX3) (as amended in 1972); see infra subpart III.B (discussing differing treatment
by courts of certain, contingent, and contested claims).
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The Government argued that the allowable deduction should be only the
actual value of payments made by the estate.105 The petitioner argued that the
actuarially determined date-of-death valuation of the claim should dictate the
allowable deduction irrespective of the actual amount of payments received
by the surviving spouse."° The Ninth Circuit agreed with the petitioner and
ruled that the estate properly deducted the actuarial present value of the future
payments.1l 1
The court based its decision on a finding that the actuarial present value
of the future payments constituted a certain and enforceable claim as of the
date of death and that, consequently, postmortem events do not influence the
valuation of the deduction."°e Relying on Propstra, the court decreed that a
"claim that is actuarily [sic] valued is not uncertain for estate tax purposes.""
Because the court found the claim to be certain and enforceable as of the date
of death, it upheld the petitioner's original valuation of the deduction."'
Thus, Propstra and Van Home establish that the Ninth Circuit supports a
date-of-death valuation for deductions of claims that are certain and enforce-
able at death, but likely will consider postmortem events when valuation is
contested or contingent."'
More recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit joined the
Ninth Circuit in its support of a date-of-death valuation for estate claims
deductions. In Smith v. Commissioner,"2 the court upheld the date-of-death
valuation of a deduction for claims of alleged overpayment of royalties for oil
and gas leases by Exxon to the decedent during her lifetime.1 In Smith, the
decedent, prior to her death, was a defendant in litigation initiated by
Exxon.1 4 Exxon overpaid the decedent royalties from oil and gas leases and
initiated litigation in an attempt to recover this overpayment."' Subsequent
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1117.
108. Id. at 1116.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. (adopting reasoning announced in Propsira); Propstra v. United States, 680
F.2d 1248, 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that postmortem events do affect value of
contingent or contested claims, but applying date-of-death standard to certain, enforceable
claims).
112. Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999).
113. See id. at 526 (refusing to consider postmortem events in valuing deductions for
claims against estates).
114. Id. at 517.
115. Id.
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to the decedent's death, this litigation resulted in a judgment favorable to
Exxon against the decedent in the amount of $2,482,719, and the petitioner-
estate deducted this amount from the gross value of the estate. 1' 6  The
petitioner-estate later reached a settlement with Exxon in the amount of
$681,840."
The Government contended that because Exxon's claims were disputed
as of the date of death, only the actual amount paid to settle the claim should
dictate the value of the allowable deduction."' The petitioner argued that
Exxon's claims were "enforceable contractual rights" as of the date of death
and that, therefore, the date-of-death valuation of these claims should dictate
the value of the allowable deduction, despite the subsequent settlement
agreement." 9
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the petitioner and remanded the case with
instructions to recalculate the allowable deduction disregarding events occur-
ring subsequent to death.120 The court reasoned that although it is impossible
to determine the precise value of a disputed claim prior to settlement or
judgment, it is possible to determine an approximate value.12 ' In support of
this proposition, the court noted that "the Commissioner has considered
himself capable of determining the value of a pending lawsuit in exact dollars
and cents, even when the claim has not been reduced to judgment.' 22 The
court did not find the Ninth Circuit's distinction between certain, enforceable
claims and contingent or contested claims to be controlling. 23 The court
suggested that the difference between certain, enforceable claims, on the one
hand, and contingent or contested claims, on the other, is one of semantics and
that it is possible to arrive at a just valuation of a claim that is not certain and
enforceable as of the date of death.'24
116. Id. at 519 n.7.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 521.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 526.
121. Id. at 525.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see Estate of Van Home v. Comm'r, 720 F.2d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 1983)
(adopting reasoning announced in Propstra); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1253,
1257 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that postmortem events do affect value of contingent or contested
claims, but applying date-of-death standard to certain, enforceable claims).
124. See Smith, 198 F.3d at 525 ("There is only a semantic difference between a claim that
may prove to be invalid and a valid claim that may prove to have a value of zero."); infra
subpart I.B (analyzing different treatment by courts of certain, contested, and contingent
claims).
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C. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits Enter the Fray
In two cases of first impression, the Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits took up this issue in 2001, joining the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits in their support of the Ithaca Trust rule. These recent opinions
suggest that date-of-death valuation is gaining support and may be indicative
of the future path of the law concerning deductions for claims.
In Estate ofMcMorris v. Commissioner, 2 ' the Tenth Circuit subscribed
to the Fifth Circuit's refusal to treat certain, enforceable claims differently
from those that are contested or contingent. 26 In McMorris, the petitioner-
estate deducted $3,960,525 from its gross value, representing the decedent's
income tax liability on the redemption of securities prior to death.'" Subse-
quently, the petitioner challenged the Commissioner's valuation of the under-
lying securities and eventually reached a settlement with the IRS increasing the
basis of the securities, thus eliminating the petitioner's tax liability alto-
gether."2 The petitioner sought a refund of the tax paid to satisfy the liability
existing as of the date of death, and the Government sought disallowance of
the petitioner's § 2053(a)(3) deduction."2 9
The petitioner argued that because the tax liability on the redemption of
the securities was certain and enforceable, the date-of-death valuation of this
liability should dictate the valuation of the allowable deduction. 3 The tax
court, however, had ruled that the liability was no longer certain and enforce-
able once the petitioner challenged the Commissioner's valuation of the
securities and that the subsequent settlement should control the valuation of
the deduction."' The Tenth Circuit agreed with the petitioner and remanded
the case with instructions to recalculate the allowable deduction disregarding
events occurring subsequent to death.132 Citing the policy concern of avoiding
uncertainty and delay and noting that a date-of-death valuation rule has the
potential to benefit either the government or taxpayers, the court rejected the
125. Estate of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2001).
126. See id. at 1263 (refusing to consider postmortem events in valuing deductions for
claims against estates).
127. Id. at 1256.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1257.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1262 ("The tax court reasoned that once the estate challenged Evelyn's tax
liabilities, they were 'no longer a valid and enforceable claim against the estate.'" (quoting
Estate of McMorris v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1552, 1555 (1999))).
132. Id. at 1263.
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Commissioner's argument that postmortem events should play a role in the
valuation of deductions for claims against estates.'33
Likewise, in Estate of 0 'Neal v. Commissioner,'34 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that the petitioner's date-of-death
valuation should control despite a subsequent settlement with the IRS that
reduced the amount of the claim outstanding against the estate. 3 ' In O 'Neal,
the decedent gifted two classes of stock in a family business to her children
during her lifetime, determining the per share value to be $54 and $61.136
Pursuant to an audit after the death of the decedent, the IRS determined the
per share value to be $375 and $415, respectively. 3 Because the statute of
limitations had expired, the Government was unable to assert a deficiency
against the estate and thus asserted transferee gift tax liability against the
donee children pursuant to § 6324.1 s The donees asserted claims against the
estate for the full amount of the transferee gift tax liability, and the appellant
deducted the amount of those claims from the gross value of the estate. 39
Subsequently, the donees reached a settlement with the IRS, arriving at per
share values of $77 and $82, respectively.
40
The Government contended that the value of the subsequent settlement
should dictate the value of the allowable deduction because it "represents the
actual amount of taxes ultimately paid.' 4' The appellant argued that value of
the Government's original claim, and not the value of the postdeath settle-
ment, should dictate the value of the deduction. 142  The Eleventh Circuit
agreed with the appellant and remanded the case with instructions to recalcu-
late the allowable deduction disregarding events occurring subsequent to
eath.143 Following the lead of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, the court sub-
133. Id. at 1261-62.
134. Estate of O'Neal v. Comm'r, 258 F.3d 1265 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
135. See id. at 1276-77 (refusing to consider postmortem events in valuing deductions for
claims against estates).
136. Id. at 1267.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1268.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1271.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1275. On remand, the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
determined that § 2053(cX2) limits the allowable value of claims deductions to the value of the
estate's assets as of the date of the decedent's death. Estate of O'Neal v. United States, 228 F.
Supp. 2d 1290, 1305 (N.D. Ala. 2002); see I.R.C. § 2053(cX2) (2000) (referring to § 2053(a)
and (b) and providing that "there shall be disallowed the amount by which the deductions
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scribed to the date-of-death rule announced in Ithaca Trust, but noted that the
valuation of deductions for claims is not necessarily determined by the claim-
ant's alleged deficiency existing as of the date of death.1M Rather, the court
suggested that lower courts should exercise "informed judgment, reasonable-
ness and common sense, weighing all relevant facts and evaluating their
aggregate significance" so as to arrive at a proper valuation for such deduc-
tions. 14' This suggests that the Eleventh Circuit contemplates a greater degree
of judicial discretion in determining the proper valuation of deductions for
claims.
In conclusion, the split in the circuits as to the propriety of considering
postmortem events in valuing § 2053(a)(3) deductions fbr claims against
estates reflects the doctrinal disarray of the law. Resolution of this issue, be
it judicial or statutory, is clearly necessary to address the underlying policy
concerns that are at stake. The following Part explores the discrete compo-
nents of the debate in an attempt to identify those issues that are critical to the
ultimate resolution of this problem by the courts or by Congress.
III. Components of the Debate
In response to the debate over the valuation of deductions for claims, the
courts have chosen to employ a bright-line rule either favoring consideration
of postmortem events or foreclosing consideration of such events altogether.
146
Eventually some resolution favoring one rule or the other must be reached so
that courts and executors alike will no longer have to grapple with the uncer-
tainty and jurisdictional inconsistency of the law as it presently exists. Three
primary components of this debate should factor into any resolution of this
issue. The first component involves an analysis of the distinction between the
valuation of deductions for claims versus the validity of such deductions, and
the proper role of postmortem events as applied to these distinct issues. 47 The
second component involves the disparate judicial treatment of claims that are
certain and enforceable at death as compared to claims that are contested or
specified therein exceed the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of property subject to
claims"). Because this deduction reduced the value of the decedent's taxable estate to zero, the
court ordered a refund of all estate taxes and interest paid by the estate. O 'Neal, 228 F. Supp.
2d at 1305.
144. Estate of O'Neal v. Comm'r, 258 F.3d 1265, 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
145. Id.
146. See supra Part I (discussing distinct circuit split, with one faction applying bright-
line rule supporting date-of-death valuation and other faction supporting consideration of
postmortem events).
147. See infra subpart IlA (analyzing distinction between valuation of deductions and
validity of claims).
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contingent."4' The third component involves a comparative analysis of the
role that postmortem events play in other estate deductions.'49
A. Deduction Valuation vs. Claim Validity
The first step in any judicial analysis of whether to consider postmortem
events is an understanding of the distinction between the valuation of deduc-
tions and the validity of claims. Before any court can arrive at a reasonable
determination of how to value deductions for claims against an estate, that
court necessarily must determine whether the claim underlying that deduction
is valid in the first place."' ° If the court finds the claim to be invalid, there is
no reason to visit the question of valuation."' Thus, it is imperative that
courts decide whether postmortem events should play a role in assessing the
validity of a claim as well as in determining the proper valuation of deductions
for such claims.
While some courts and scholars support the position that postmortem
events dictate both the validity of claims and the valuation of deductions for
claims, others favor the competing position that determinations of valuation
and validity warrant separate consideration." 2 The first judicial treatment of
this distinction arose in Jacobs."5 3 The basis for the court's disallowance of
the deduction in that case was a finding that no claim existed at the date of
death or at any subsequent time because the appellant never affirmatively
asserted a claim for the $75,000 payment." 4 The court noted, "The claims
which Congress intended to be deducted were actual claims, not theoretical
ones. Indeed, a claim without a claimant is a sort of legal figment, which has
the tendency to produce intellectual dizziness .. .. " The Jacobs court
interpreted the statute" 6 to mean that the allowance of a deduction for a claim
148. See infra subpart Ifl.B (contrasting certain, enforceable claims with contested and
contingent claims).
149. See infra subpart IlI.C (discussing valuation of other estate deductions).
150. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958) ("Only claims enforceable against the decedent's
estate may be deducted.").
151. If the court determines that the claim is not enforceable against the decedent's estate,
there is no need to proceed any further with valuation analysis because Tres. Reg. § 20.2053-4
expressly disallows such claims. Id.
152. See supra note 17 (noting leading cases from circuits favoring date-of-death valuation
rule); supra note 18 (noting leading cases from circuits rejecting date-of-death valuation rule).
153. See Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233, 236 (8th Cir. 1929) (ruling that postdeath events
should play role in valuing deductions for claims).
154. Id. at 235.
155. Id.
156. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 403(aX1), 42 Stat. 227, 279 (current version at
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against an estate hinges on the existence of a valid and enforceable claim as
of the date of death and on the assertion of a right to that claim by an actual
claimant.'57 The court considered postmortem events, specifically the
widow's failure to assert a claim subsequent to the decedent's death, and
determined that the initial deduction was invalid. 58 The court then applied
the same reasoning in holding invalid the date-of-death valuation of the
deduction for this claim.'59 Thus, Jacobs established the principle that courts
should consider postmortem events in determining not only the valuation of
deductions for claims, but also in determining the validity of such deductions.
The Treasury Department also subscribes to this logic, prohibiting
deductions when the claimant waives payment, fails to file a claim within
prescribed time limits, fails to follow proper filing procedures, or otherwise
does not pursue a claim."6 Under this reasoning, even if a court finds that a
valid claim existed as of the date of death, a deduction for such a claim would
be invalid absent an affirmative attempt to assert the claim. 6' This rule
necessarily requires that executors and courts look to postmortem events in
determining not only the valuation of deductions for claims, but also the
validity of such claims.
However, opposition exists to this interpretation of the legislative intent
underlying § 2053(a)(3). 62 Although the Jacobs opinion mandated the
consideration of postmortem events in determining both the valuation and the
validity of deductions for claims, there is support for considering the effect of
postmortem events on valuation and validity separately. 63 Several courts
I.R.C. § 2053(a) (2000)) (providing for deduction of "such amounts for funeral expenses,
administration expenses, claims against the estate, unpaid mortgages... [and] losses incurred
during the settlement of the estate arising from... casualty, or from theft").
157. See Jacobs, 34 F.2d at 235 ("It was, in our opinion, claims presented and allowed or
otherwise determined as valid against the estate and actually paid or to be paid that Congress




160. See Rev. Rul. 60-247, 1960-2 C.B. 272, 273 ("It is the position of the Internal
Revenue Service that no deduction will be allowed for claims against the estate which have not
been paid or will not be paid because the creditor waives payment, fails to file his claim.., or
otherwise fails to enforce payment.").
161. Id.
162. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 47, 5.03[5][b], at 5-25 n.121 (criticizing Trea-
sury's interpretation in Revenue Ruling 60-247 and suggesting that "claims can exist at death
and be perfectly bona fide and allowable even though the creditor never presses for, or even if
the creditor expressly waives the right to, payment").
163. See JOHN A. BOwDANSKI, FEDERAL TAX VALUATION 2.01 [3][c][iv], at 2-74 n.282
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have expressed skepticism toward the current trend of aggregating the analysis
of valuation and validity issues.1" These courts separate valuation and
validity issues into two discrete categories of cases, supporting the position
that while postmortem events should play a role in determining the validity of
a claim, they should not play a role in determining the valuation of a deduc-
tion." When the validity of the claim is not at issue, these courts subscribe
to the Ithaca Trust rule and refuse to consider postmortem events in determin-
ing the proper valuation of a deduction for a claim.1" However, when the
validity of the claim is at issue, these courts consider postmortem events in
determining the validity of the claim, but not in determining the valuation of
a deduction for that claim. 67
Furthermore, although they hold the minority view, these courts support
a facts-and-circumstances analysis on a case-by-case basis to determine which
rule to apply. Remarking on the difficulty of reconciling these issues with a
hard and fast rule, the Tax Court noted, "While we share the yearning for
certainty in this area, we are not persuaded that a legislative solution is
(6th ed. 1996) ("It has been suggested that postdeath events might be more worthy of consider-
ation concerning the validity of a claim rather than its valuation.").
164. See Estate of Kyle v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 829, 850-51 (1990) (espousing position that
court should consider postdeath events in determining validity of claim, but not in determining
valuation); Estate of Cafaro v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1002, 1005-06 (1989) (separating
valuation and enforceability issues into two separate categories of cases); Estate of Van Home
v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 728, 737 (1982) (suggesting that while Ithaca Trust rule might not apply
to validity of deductions, it does apply to valuation of deductions).
165. See Cafaro, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1005-06 (identifying two separate standards for
analyzing valuation and validity issues). The court stated:
In sorting out the cases and seeking a unifying thread, we have found two broad
categories of cases: (1) valuation cases where value is to be determined as of the
date-of-death... and (2) enforceability cases where claims against the estate are
only potential, unmatured, contingent, or contested at date-of-death so that of
necessity courts must look to post-death evidence.
Id.; see also Van Home, 78 T.C. at 737 ("It is one thing to distinguish Ithaca Trust in cases
involving enforceability of a claimed debt, but to distinguish it here [as applied to valuation]
would be to distinguish it to the point of extinction.").
166. See Kyle, 94 T.C. at 850 (noting that in Van Home, the Tax Court held that "the
general principle announced in Ithaca Trust is applicable in cases involving the valuation of
claims against the estate"); Cafaro, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1006 (declaring that "[for valuation
issues, post-death events... are simply not relevant").
167. See Kyle, 94 T.C. at 851 ("The dispute in this case involves enforceability or validity
of [a] claim, not just valuation of a valid claim. Thus we look to post-death events to determine
whether the... claim was a valid claim against decedent's estate."); Cafaro, 57 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 1006 (finding that because "the present case does not involve either a sum certain or a claim
that was legally enforceable at the date of the decedent's death.., evidence of post-death events
is relevant here").
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possible or desirable. We see the problem as an issue of relevance which trial
judges must wrestle with depending upon the context and the facts of the
particular case.'11
68
However, some commentators argue that applying different rules in
determining valuation and validity issues is untenable. One suggests that "in
determining the fair market value of a claim for inclusion purposes, its appar-
ent validity is certainly a relevant factor; thus, the distinction between
enforceability and valuation seems strained."'69 At least two courts have also
expressly rejected a two-pronged analysis. 7 ° Most notably, the Fifth Circuit
remarked,
Although this dichotomy, which distinguishes between enforceability on
the one hand and valuation on the other, has superficial appeal, closer
examination reveals that it is not a sound basis for distinguishing claims in
this context. There is only a semantic difference between a claim that may
prove to be invalid and a valid claim that may prove to have a value of
zero. 1
71
This seems to be the more reasoned analysis. Any court faced with determin-
ing the proper valuation of a deduction for a claim must first determine the
validity of the underlying claim.172 For two reasons, it seems counterintuitive
to mandate consideration of postdeath events with regard to the validity of a
claim and then to ignore such events in determining the proper valuation of a
deduction for the same claim. First, in almost all situations, the same factors
weigh on issues of both valuation and validity.17 3  There is no effective
mechanism to ensure that courts will not subconsciously apply these factors
to one determination and not to the other. Second, for reasons of practicality
168. Cafaro, 57 T.C.M. (CCII) at 1006 n.6.
169. BOODANSKI, supra note 163, 1 2.01[3][c][iv], at 2-74 n.282.
170. See Estate of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254,1263 (10th Cir. 2001) (criticizing
Tax Court's reliance on distinction between enforceability of claim on one hand and valuation
of claim on the other); Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 525 (5th Cir. 1999) (rejecting
application of one rule for validity and application of another rule for valuation).
171. Smith, 198 F.3d at 525.
172. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (noting that Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4
expressly disallows deductions for unenforceable claims, thus obviating need for valuation
analysis if court finds claim unenforceable).
173. Examples of the factors that influence judicial decisions include the following:
1) whether or not it is possible to determine the amount of the claim with precision, 2) whether
determination of the amount of the claim requires the use of actuarial tables, 3) whether a claim
that was enforceable as of the decedent's date of death becomes unenforceable after the dece-
dent's death, 4) whether the claim is disputed, and 5) whether the claim is contingent. See
Meresidis, supra note 3, at 2718-34 (examining factors courts face in addressing deductions
for claims).
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and consistency, arming courts with a hard and fast rule applicable to both
valuation and validity determinations seems to be the more efficient
solution.174 For these reasons, whether the ultimate resolution of this issue
results in a bright-line rule favoring consideration of postmortem events or
one that prohibits consideration of such events, this rule should apply equally
to determinations of the validity of claims and to determinations of the proper
valuation of deductions for such claims.
B. Certain vs. Contingent or Contested Claims
Closely related to this debate over validity and valuation is the distinction
between certain, enforceable claims and those that are contingent or
contested. 7 ' The courts have not been successful in establishing a uniformly
applicable rule that differentiates between these claims, and unfortunately
neither the code nor the treasury regulations provide much guidance on the
issue. Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-4 prescribes, "The amounts that may be
deducted as claims against a decedent's estate are such only as represent
personal obligations of the decedent existing at the time of his death, whether
or not then matured, and interest thereon which had accrued at the time of
death."' 76 Thus, claims that have not yet matured at the date of death are
eligible for a deduction pursuant to the regulation.'77 Furthermore, Treasury
Regulation § 20.2053-1(b)(3) provides, "An itemmay be entered onthe return
for deduction though its exact amount is not then known, provided it is ascer-
tainable with reasonable certainty, and will be paid. No deduction may be
taken upon the basis of a vague or uncertain estimate.""17 This regulation
permits the deduction of a claim even if it is impossible to assign an exact
value to the claim so long as the estate can reasonably estimate its value. 9
Neither regulation expressly prohibits deductions for contested or contingent
174. See McMorris, 243 F.3d at 1261-62 (observing that bright-line rules bring "more
certainty to estate administration, an ideal which has long been promoted by judge and commen-
tator alike"); Comm'r v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1960) (Moore, J.,
dissenting) ("In the field of estate tax law it is particularly important that there be as much
certainty as possible."); Robert Clive Jones, Estate and Income Tar. Claims Against the Estate
andEvents ubsequent to Dateof-Death, 22 UCLA L. REV. 654, 681 (1975) (arguing that "the
current approach to timing the valuation of claims must be made more certain and consistent").
175. See Meresidis, supra note 3, at 2718-22 (discussing certain, enforceable claims); id.
at 2725-28 (discussing disputed claims); id. at 2732-34 (discussing contingent claims).
176. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958).
177. See Kasner, supra note 25, at 960 (noting potentially conflicting interpretations of
regulations regarding contingent and contested claims).
178. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(bX3) (as amended in 1972).
179. See Kasner, supra note 25, at 958 (noting that Treasury Regulation 20.2053-1(b)(3)
"requires only that [the claim] can be valued with reasonable certainty and will be paid").
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claims,' and no regulation speaks to the propriety of considering postmortem
events in valuing such claims. Therefore, central to the debate over consider-
ation of postmortem events is the proper treatment of certain, contingent, and
contested claims.
Paralleling the circuit split is the debate over the propriety of considering
postmortem events with respect to claims that are certain and enforceable at
death."" Problems arise in two distinct scenarios. First, there is disagreement
as to the validity of a deduction when the creditor fails to pursue the claim'8 2
or cannot pursue the claim for procedural reasons. 8 3 Second, there is disagree-
ment as to the validity of a deduction when a postdeath event alters the value
of the claim.'8 4
Mandating consideration of postmortem events under the first scenario
certainly seems plausible. When a certain and enforceable claim exists at
death and the creditor never asserts a right to that claim or cannot assert such
a right for procedural reasons, it is arguable that permitting a deduction for the
claim would result in a windfall to the estate.8" This is decidedly the view of
180. See id. ("Under the regulations, it is clearly not a requirement that the claim in
question be 'matured' at the date of death; it is also not clearly necessary to determine whether
the claim is subject to contingencies or disputes.").
181. Compare Estate of Van Home v. Comm'r, 720 F.2d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding actuarially determined value of claim to be certain, and thus refusing to consider
postdeath events that alter value), and Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding that "as a matter of law, when claims are for sums certain and are legally
enforceable as of the date-of-death, post-death events are not relevant in computing the
permissible deduction"), with Estate of Sachs v. Comm'r, 856 F.2d 1158, 1159 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding invalid deduction for tax liability that was certain and enforceable on death, but
subsequently relieved by amendment to tax laws), and Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233,235 (8th
Cir. 1929) (refusing to uphold deduction that was certain and enforceable on death, but never
enforced).
182. A creditor may choose not to pursue a claim because another party is primarily (or
jointly) liable or because other property secures the claim. 5 BoRIs I. BrrTKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND G 1rs 131.4.2, at 131-22 n.20 (2d ed.
1993). For an example, see Schiffman v. United States, 51 F. Supp. 728, 732 (Ct. Cl. 1943)
(denying deduction for claim after creditor restructured loan with other guarantors).
183. An example of a procedural default is the failure of a creditor to present a claim within
the temporal parameters of the statute of limitations. 5 BrrK.ER & LOKKEN, supra note 182,
131.4.2.
184. Compare Estate of O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265, 1266, 1268 (11th Cir.
2001) (ruling that deduction based on date-of-death valuation was valid although parties settled
claim for lesser amount subsequent to death) with Comm'r v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372,
373-75 (2d Cir. 1960) (ruling that deduction based on date-of-death valuation was not valid
because estate's ultimate liability was less than 10% of the value of the deduction).
185. See William L. Raby & Burgess J.W. Raby, Post-Death Events and Claims Against
Estates, 91 TAx NOTES 105, 106 (2001) (observing that permitting estates to deduct claims that
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those circuits that favor consideration of postmortem events in determining the
proper valuation of deductions for claims. 86 Nonetheless, those circuits
holding the opposing view allow a deduction based on a date-of-death valua-
tion even if it results in a windfall to the estate." As an example of one means
of rationalizing this view, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
pointed to the language of Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-4, which states in
part, "Only claims enforceable against the decedent's estate may be
deducted.' s The Ninth Circuit noted that this regulation "speaks of 'enforce-
able' rather than 'enforced' claims" as a basis for allowing deductions for
claims never pursued by the creditor." 9 Thus, in spite of the potential for
windfalls to estates, disagreement as to the appropriate treatment of unen-
forced claims that are certain and enforceable still exists.
Mandating consideration' of postmortem events under the second
scenario' 90 presents equally challenging problems. When a postmortem event
alters the value of a claim that was certain and enforceable at death, the poten-
tial for a windfall to an estate also exists. 9' Those circuits favoring consider-
ation of postmortem events in valuing deductions for claims refuse to enable
this potentiality absent a clear mandate from Congress." Yet there is also
support for a rule that addresses the public policy issue of reducing uncertainty
and delay in estate administration.'93 The bright-line rule favoring consider-
will not be paid constitutes windfall in certain cases). For a discussion of whether a deduction
for a claim that is never paid constitutes income to the estate, see generally I BrIKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 182, 5.7.
186. See Jacobs, 34 F.2d at 235 ("It was, in our opinion, claims presented and allowed...
and actually paid or to be paid that Congress had in mind, when it provided for the
deduction . ").
187. See Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1254-56 (9th Cir. 1982) (adhering to
strict interpretation of statute, and relying on interpretation of legislative intent to validate date-
of-death rule, even when claim is never enforced).
188. Id. at 1255 (citing Tress. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958)).
189. Id.
190. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting disagreement over validity of
claim when postdeath events alter value of claim).
191. If, for example, a creditor holds a certain, enforceable claim for an unpaid debt against
an estate as of the date of the decedent's death and the executor settles this claim subsequent
to the decedent's death for a lesser amount, the estate realizes a windfall under a date-of-death
valuation rule. See Meresidis, supra note 3, at 2705 (providing hypothetical illustration of how
date-of-death rule results in windfalls to estates).
192. See Estate of Sachs v. Comm'r, 856 F.2d 1158, 1163 (8th Cir. 1988) (invalidating
deduction for tax liability relieved by amendment to tax laws, and suggesting that "Congress
may grant windfalls to taxpayers if it wishes, but it would take a much clearer expression than
what we have here to convince us that it intended to do so").
193. See supra note 174 (providing examples of courts and commentators critical of
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ation of postmortem events does not establish any basis for determining
temporal limitations when applying the rule. An estate that takes a deduction
for a certain and enforceable claim existing as of the date of death might
subsequently face the prospect of disallowance of that deduction long after the
completion of estate administration.194 Such a result might work a severe
hardship on individual executors, and furthermore, it undermines the strong
public policy concern for efficient and timely administration of estates.19 If
the courts ultimately choose to consider postmortem events in valuing deduc-
tions for claims, they would best serve public policy by encouraging the
legislature to define a reasonable period of limitation restricting such consider-
ations after a certain length of time."
The law is in even greater disarray with regard to contingent or contested
claims. Those favoring consideration of postdeath events with regard to
contingent or contested claims base their argument on the proposition that it is
impossible, without looking to postdeath events, to value a claim that is contin-
gent upon a postdeath event or that is contested as of the date of death."9 The
opposing position favors the consideration of the contingencies or disputes
involved to determine a reasonable deduction valuation, but does not mandate
resolution of the contingency or dispute as a prerequisite to sustaining that
valuation.
198
Perhaps most illustrative of the contentious nature of this debate is the IRS
response to the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Estate of Smith v. Commissioner.'" The deduction at issue in Smith involved
a claim by Exxon for royalties from oil and gas leases.2"o As of the date of the
decedent's death, the parties were litigating the claim, and, therefore, the value
of the claim was contingent upon the ultimate outcome of the litigation.20'
uncertainty, delay, and inconsistency in estate administration).
194. See Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1159 (invalidating deduction two years after filing of estate
return); Comm'r v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372, 373-74 (2d Cir. 1960) (invalidating
deduction eight full years after decedent's death and seven years after estate filed return).
195. Cf. Madden & Hayes, supra note 15, at 550 ("We believe that creating an arbitrary
rule for claims that prohibits consideration of post-death events does not speed up the prepara-
tion or processing of an estate tax return, or make the system significantly fairer.").
196. Legislating a suitable statute of limitations would prove challenging. Opponents
would attack as arbitrary any proposed temporal cut-off for consideration of postdeath events.
197. See Kasner, supra note 25, at 958 (discussing competing arguments regarding
contingent and contested claims).
198. See id. (same).
199. Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999), nonacq., 2000-1 C.B. xvi.
200. Id. at 518-20.
201. Id. at519.
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Reversing a Tax Court decision ° that limited the deduction to the amount
actually paid to settle the claim, the Fifth Circuit relied on Ninth Circuit
precedent in ruling that the date-of-death valuation should stand.20 3
The IRS later announced its nonacquiescence to the Smith decision. 4 In
an Action on Decision explaining its nonacquiescence, the IRS pointed out that
the Ninth Circuit cases upon which the Smith court relied involved certain,
enforceable claims and not contingent or contested claims. 201 This distinction
finds support in the case law. The Ninth Circuit itself expressly supported
consideration of postdeath events with respect to contingent or contested
claims.2 °6 This dispute suggests that, at least in the Ninth Circuit, there are two
separate rules: first, a rule that prohibits consideration of postdeath events
when the deduction is for a certain, enforceable claim and, second, a rule that
permits consideration ofpostdeath events when the deduction is for a contested
or contingent claim. In its Action on Decision, the IRS noted, "Every court,
except the Fifth Circuit, that has addressed the.., issue where the claim is
contested, contingent, or unenforceable on the date-of-death, has considered
postdeath events in determining the allowable deduction."2'
This dispute between the Fifth Circuit and the IRS suggests a potentially
viable resolution to the issue. When an estate deducts the value of a claim that
is certain and enforceable on death, courts should not look to postdeath events
in determining the propriety of that valuation. However, when the deduction
is for a contingent or contested claim, courts should consider postmortem
events. Unfortunately, this solution does not account for the potential of
202. See Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 108 T.C. 412, 419 (1997) ("Where a claim is
disputed, contingent, or uncertain as of the date of the decedent's death, the estate is not entitled
to a deduction until the claim is resolved and it is determined what amount, if any, will be
paid."), rev'd, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999).
203. The court cited Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982), and Estate
of Van Home v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), for the proposition that a date-
of-death valuation should apply to deductions for claims that are certain and enforceable at
death. Smith, 198 F.3d at 522-23.
204. 2000-1 C.B. xvi.
205. See I.R.S. Action on Decision 2000-04 (May 9, 2000), 2000 AOD LEXIS 4, at *5
(noting that Ninth Circuit cases relied on by court "involved claims that were certain and
enforceable at death, and in both cases, the Ninth Circuit limited its holding to 'certain and
enforceable' claims").
206. See Van Home, 720 F.2d at 1116-17 (adopting rule announced in Propstra);
Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1253 ("The law is clear that post-death events are relevant when comput-
ing the deduction to be taken for disputed or contingent claims.").
207. 2000 AOD LEXIS 4, at *5. The IRS cited as support Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320
F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1963), Estate ofJacobs v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929), Estate
of Cafaro v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1002 (1989), Estate of Courtney v. Commis-
sioner, 62 T.C. 317 (1974), and Taylor v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 371 (1962). 2000 AOD
LEXIS 4, at *5-6.
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windfalls to estates when the value of certain and enforceable claims decreases
as a result of postdeath events, but it does address the policy interest of avoid-
ing uncertainty and delay in estate administration. 2°
One commentator proposes a more complex rule that would also distin-
guish between contingent and contested claims. Jerry Kasner suggests:
If the claim is contingent, then it should be valued on the basis of facts
known at the date of death, and the unresolved contingency would be a
factor inthatvalue. If the claim is contested, then the validity of any deduc-
tion, and certainly the amount, may depend on postdeath events. Even in
this case, the law does not assume the final payment determines the actual
amount of the deductible claim, although it is strong evidence of its value
at the date of death.
2°9
While this argument has superficial appeal, it is susceptible to attack on two
fronts. First, it assumes that there is a reliable way for courts to derive a date-
of-death valuation.2"' Second, precise differentiation of "contested" and
"contingent" claims may prove challenging in many circumstances. 2" For
practical reasons, it seems more reasonable to have a single rule that applies to
both contingent and contested claims.212
The dispute between the IRS and the Fifth Circuit suggests that the
ultimate resolution of this issue will include a rule that permits consideration
of postmortem events in valuing deductions for contingent or contested claims,
but prohibits consideration of such events in valuing deductions for certain,
enforceable claims. 2 '3 This is probably the most reasonable and equitable
solution, but it is vital that the courts fashion the rule in such a way as to
minimize windfalls to estates.
C. Deductions for Claims vs. Other Estate Deductions
Another controversial aspect of the debate over considering postmortem
events is the fact that other deductions permitted pursuant to § 2053(a) neces-
208. See supra note 174 (providing examples of courts and commentators critical of
uncertainty, delay, and inconsistency in estate administration).
209. Kasner, supra note 25, at 960.
210. See Meresidis, supra note 3, at 2712 (observing that it is often very difficult to
ascertain the value of a contingent claim, such as a tort claim, with any precision).
211. See Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d 515, 525 (5th Cir. 1999) (dismissing as
unsound the basis used by the Tax Court in drawing distinction between certain, enforceable
claims and disputed or contingent claims).
212. See id. (criticizing use of different standards for different types of claims).
213. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text (discussing IRS response to Smith,
and noting possibility that hybrid rule will emerge favoring date-of-death valuation for certain,
enforceable claims, but not for contested or contingent claims).
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sarily require analysis of events occurring subsequent to death. Specifically,
that section permits the estate to deduct the value of funeral expenses and
estate administration expenses." 4 The estate cannot definitively value these
expenses as of the date of death. Proponents of a rule authorizing consider-
ation of postmortem events with respect to claims proffer an interesting argu-
ment. They argue that because Congress included the provision governing
claims deductions in the same code section as the provisions governing funeral
and administration expenses, which necessarily mandate consideration of
postdeath events, Congress intended that postdeath events also be a factor in
valuing deductions for claims.1 ' Proponents of a date-of-death valuation rule
argue that the legislative history does not support such an interpretation and
note that § 2053(a) also contains a provision for the deduction of unpaid
mortgages,"' a value that is readily ascertainable in most circumstances
without regard to postdeath events.217
One pair of commentators aptly refers to this argument as "the 'guilt by
association' approach to discerning congressional intent."" Under this
approach, opponents of a date-of-death valuation assert that although legisla-
tive intent is not clear with regard to claims, it is clear with regard to funeral
and administration expenses, and, consequently, courts should infer that
postmortem events play a role in valuing all deductions permitted under
§ 2053(a). The Eighth Circuit, in Jacobs, was the first court to lend credence
to the "guilt by association" argument.219 The Jacobs court, in support of its
belief that valuation of claims should not rely on facts only existing at the date
of death, boldly asserted that the Supreme Court "has not said that the deduc-
tions authorized by paragraph (1) of section 403 must be determined solely by
the facts and conditions existing on the day of the death, and we are confident
214. See I.R.C. § 2053(aX1)-(2) (2000) ("TIThe value of the taxable estate shall be
determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate such amounts--1) for funeral
expenses, [and] (2) for administration expenses.... ").
215. See Raby & Raby, supra note 185, at 106 (discussing "guilt by association" argument
that if Congress supported date-of-death valuation, it would not have included provision for
claims deductions in § 2053(a)).
216. See I.R.C. § 20 53(aX4) (2000) (permitting deduction "for unpaid mortgages on, or
any indebtedness in respect of, property where the value of the decedent's interest therein,
undiminished by such mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate").
217. See Estate of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254,1261 (10th Cir. 2001) (comment-
ing that "we find it insignificant that Congress placed funeral and estate administration ex-
penses, which are calculated after death, with claims against the estate in section 2053(a),
because that section also contains a deduction for unpaid mortgages, which may be calculated
without reference to post-death events").
218. Raby&Raby, supra note 185, at 106.
219. See Jacobs v. Comm'r, 34 F.2d 233, 236 (8th Cir. 1929) (analyzing legislative intent
with regard to claims, funeral expenses, and estate administration expenses).
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that [Cjourt will never say so."" ° The Jacobs court went on to note that "[a]ll
these, funeral expenses, administration expenses, and claims against the estate,
under this paragraph, were intended by Congress to be determined in the course
of an orderly administration of the estate in and by state courts."22' In support
of its interpretation of the legislature's intention that postmortem events should
play a role in valuation, the court noted that Section 405 ofthe Revenue Act of
1921 directs the government to prepare the estate return when an estate fails to
file a return or if an estate return misrepresents a material fact.222 Without
providing any statutory or judicial support, the court summarily interpreted this
to mean that the government should look to postmortem events when preparing
a return pursuant to Section 405. z The logic of the court's reasoning is
flawed. Section 405 of the Revenue Act of 1921 only speaks to the fact that
Congress authorized preparation of returns by the collector in certain circum-
stances.22 4 The statute contains no language indicating a preference for consid-
ering postmortem events in determining the valuation of deductions in the
course of such preparation of returns. 25 Without more concrete support, the
court's decision to read into the statute a requirement of considering postmor-
tern events seems untenable. Furthermore, there is no indication of a prefer-
ence for considering postmortem events in the code's current counterpart to
Section 405, even though Congress has had more than eighty years to amend
the language of that section to indicate such intent.26 For these reasons, the
220. Id. The Jacobs court was referring to Section 403 of the Revenue Act of 1921. See
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 403(aX1), 42 Stat. 227, 279 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 2053(a) (2000)) (permitting deductions for funeral expenses, administration expenses, claims,
unpaid mortgages, and casualty losses incurred during settlement of estate). History has shown
that this statement was not so bold. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue in the
seventy-four years that have lapsed since the Jacobs opinion.
221. Jacobs, 34 F.2d at 236.
222. Id.; see Revenue Act of 1921, § 405 (current version at I.R.C. § 6020(b)(1) (2000))
(directing government to prepare return in certain circumstances). This provision states in
relevant part:
[I]f no administration is granted upon the estate of a decedent, or if no return is
filed as provided in section 404, or if a return contains a false or incorrect statement
of a material fact, the collector or deputy collector shall make a return and the
Commissioner shall assess the tax thereon.
Id.
223. Jacobs, 34 F.2d at 236.
224. Revenue Act of 1921, § 405(aXl) (current version at I.R.C. § 6020(bX1) (2000)).
225. Id.
226. See I.R.C. § 6020(bX1) (2000) ("If any person fails to make any return required by
any internal revenue law or regulation made thereunder at the time prescribed therefore, or
makes, willfully or otherwise, a false or fraudulent return, the Secretary shall make such return
from his own knowledge and from such information as he can obtain through testimony or
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language of Section 405 has no bearing whatsoever on the role of postmortem
events in valuing deductions for claims, and as a result, the Jacobs court's
reliance on this section was misplaced.
Those opposing the "guilt by association" approach attack not only their
opponents' attenuated interpretation of legislative intent, but also offer three
other persuasive arguments. First, they point out that § 2053(a) also contains
a provision for the deduction of unpaid mortgages, the value of which is
determinable without consideration of postmortem events.22 Second, they
assert that consideration of postmortem events in valuing deductions is
contrary to the estate tax's underlying purpose: taxation of the estate as it
exists at the moment of death.' One commentator even goes so far as to
claim that decisions rejecting a date-of-death valuation "fly in the face of early
precedent and are inconsistent with the obvious purpose of the estate tax to
measure the taxable estate at death, except where Congress clearly elects to
recognize post-death events."'229 Third, they point to other parts of the code
as evidence that when Congress intends the consideration of postmortem
events, it manifests this intention clearly and unequivocally.23°
The argument against the "guilt by association" approach to congressio-
nal intent seems to be the more reasonable interpretation. An attempt to draw
inferences about legislative intent based on the provisions contained within
the same code section as the rule at issue is unpersuasive. In other parts of the
code, if it is not obvious that postdeath events should play a role, Congress has
been clear in expressing its intentions as to whether consideration of such
events is appropriate." Of course, it is plausible that omission of any direc-
otherwise.").
227. See Estate of McMorris v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1254, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001) (arguing
that Congress would not have included deduction for unpaid mortgages in § 2053(a) if it
intended consideration of postmortem events for all deductions in that section).
228. See STEP-ENS ET AL., supra note 47, 5.03 [5][b] (rejecting consideration of postmor-
tem events in valuing deductions as contrary to policy underlying estate tax generally).
229. Id.
230. See Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1256 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Moreover,
except with regard to matters like funeral and administrative expenses, which by their very
nature require valuation aler a decedent's death, Congress has been explicit in providing for
consideration of post-death events."). The Propstra court offered as examples § 2013, § 2032,
and § 2054 of the tax code, all of which contain valuation schemes that require consideration
of postmortem events. Id.; see I.R.C. § 2013 (2000) (requiring consideration of postdeath
events in computation of credit for tax on prior transfers); id. § 2032 (requiring consideration
of postdeath events for estates electing alternate valuation of assets); id. § 2054 (requiring
consideration of postmortem events in computing deductions for casualty losses occurring
during estate administration).
231. See supra note 230 (discussing examples of other code sections in which Congress
has clearly manifested its intent that postdeath events play role in valuation
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tion as to consideration of postdeath events in valuing deductions for claims
against estates was simply an oversight. However, in the seventy-four years
since Holmes's decision in Ithaca Trust, Congress has done nothing to correct
this oversight."2 It is more likely that Congress simply views this issue as a
hot potato more appropriate for judicial determination.
IV Postmortem Events and Asset Valuation
Unfortunately, the issue of valuation of § 205 3(a)(3) deductions is indeed
a hot potato thus far beyond the reach of judicial resolution. From what
quarter, then, will come relief from the uncertainty and delay in estate adminis-
tration caused by the current disarray of the law? One component of the
debate largely ignored thus far by the courts and scholars alike in determining
the proper timing for valuing deductions for claims is a comparative analysis
of the role that postmortem events play in the valuation of assets for estate tax
purposes. Similar policy concerns underlie both issues, and the principles
governing the role of postmortem events in determining asset valuation should
factor into the debate over the role of such events in the valuation of deduc-
tions for claims.2
3
As a general proposition, postmortem events do not play a role in asset
valuation for purposes of determining the value of the gross estate. First, the
language of the statutes and the regulations governing computation of the gross
estate contain express language mandating a date-of-death valuation.2"
Second, the accepted practice of determining the fair market value of assets
involves determining the consideration a willing buyer would pay a willing
seller for that asset on a particular date.25 Because the theoretical buyer and
seller do not have the benefit of hindsight in determining the proper valuation
of an asset, courts typically refuse to consider postmortem events in valuing
assets. 6 Third, the code provides for an alternate valuation date for assets in
limited circumstances."' The existence of this provision lends credence to an
232. Supra note 220.
233. See Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Seize theDay-Valuation andPost-Death
Events, 1999 TAX NoTEs TODAY 249-21, 18 ("Every tax practitioner knows that estates are
taxable on the value of the assets the decedent owned .... That value is determined as of the
date of death or the alternate valuation date, if elected. Claims against the estate should
logically be treated in the same manner.").
234. See infra subpart IVA (discussing express language of code and treasury regulations
mandating date-of-death valuation).
235. See infra subpart IV.B (discussing "fair market value" doctrine).
236. See infra subpart IV.B (explaining courts' refusal to consider "hindsight" when
valuing estate assets).
237. See infra subpart IV.C (discussing alternate valuation date provision of § 2032).
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interpretation that postmortem events should play a role in valuing assets only
if expressly permitted by Congress.
A. Express Language of the Statutes and Regulations
As a practical matter, the most persuasive argument against considering
postmortem events when valuing assets is the plain language of the statutes
and regulations governing computation of the gross estate. With the exception
of the alternate valuation election in § 2032, virtually every code section and
treasury regulation that relates to the gross estate contains language expressly
prescribing the date of death as the time for valuation." 8 Such express lan-
guage weighs heavily against the argument that postmortem events should play
a role in valuing assets and determining the value of the gross estate.
Section 2031 of the code provides a definition of "gross estate." '39 That
section states in part that "[t]he value of the gross estate of the decedent shall
be determined by including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at
the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible,
wherever situated."24 The treasury regulations accompanying § 2031 further
provide, "The value of every item of property includible in a decedent's gross
estate.., is its fair market value at the time ofthe decedent's death, except that
if the executor elects the alternate valuation method under section 2032, it is
the fair market value" as of the alternate valuation date prescribed by that
section.241
Section 2033 of the code governs the inclusion of the decedent's property
interests in the gross estate. This section states, "The value of the gross estate
shall include the value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the
decedent at the time of his death."'242 The treasury regulations accompanying
§ 2033 further provide:
The gross estate of a decedent who was a citizen or resident of the United
States at the time of his death includes under section 2033 the value of all
property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, and wherever
situated, beneficially owned by the decedent at the time of his death.243
238. See I.R.C. §§ 2031-46 (2000) (governing valuation of gross estate). The only tax
code provision other than § 2032 that expressly provides for a valuation adjustment based on
postmortem events is § 2031 (c)(9), which provides for the allowance of a deduction for
qualified conservation easements granted to the estate after decedent's death, but before the
estate return due date. Id. § 203 1(c)(9).
239. See id. § 2031 (defining "gross estate").
240. Id. § 2031 (a) (emphasis added).
241. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965) (emphasis added).
242. I.R.C. § 2033 (2000) (emphasis added).
243. Tress. Reg. § 20.2033-1(a) (as amended in 1963) (emphases added).
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Similar language prescribing the date of death as the measure for valuation
appears in other sections of the code relating to computation of the gross
estate.2 "
Facially, the code and the treasury regulations establish a presumptive
date-of-death valuation rule for purposes of determining the gross estate.245
The express language of the statutory scheme leaves little doubt as to the
legislative intent regarding the timing of valuation of the gross estate's assets.
It is the glaring omission of such express language in § 2053(a)(3) that has
spawned a seventy-four-year debate over the role of postmortem events in
valuing deductions for claims against estates.246
B. Fair Market Value and Hindsight
Underlying the express statutory language of the code with respect to
valuing assets is the doctrine of fair market value. As previously noted,
Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-1 (b) prescribes that for purposes of the gross
estate, the value of an asset is its fair market value at the date of death.247 It is
in determining what actually constitutes fair market value that the question of
using hindsight becomes important.
The generally accepted definitidn of fair market value for purposes of the
estate tax is "the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."24 This
definition presumes that the buyer and seller have knowledge of the relevant
facts that exist as of the date of valuation, but that it is impossible for them to
have knowledge of events that occur after the date of valuation.249 Therefore,
subsequent events that alter this valuation do not truly reflect the fair market
value of assets based on the knowledge of the buyer and seller on the date of
valuation, and courts generally refuse to consider subsequent events.
250
244. See I.R.C. § 2034 (2000) (including dower and curtesy interests existing "at the time
of the decedent's death" in gross estate); id. § 2035 (including in gross estate value of gifts
made by decedent "during the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death").
245. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 47, 4.02 ("Section 2031 also expresses the
presumptive date-of-death rule for the time of valuation.").
246. See supra text accompanying notes 231-32 (suggesting that omission of any direction
in § 2053(aX3) as to consideration of postdeath events was not legislative oversight).
247. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965). This section also requires the use
of fair market value in determining the value of assets under the alternate valuation date of
§ 2032. Id.
248. Id.
249. See BOGDANSKI, supra note 163, 2.01[3][e][i] (discussing role of hindsight in
determining fair market value of assets).
250. See id. ("This attitude flows from the perception that the willing buyer and willing
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The proposition that the proper value of assets for estate tax purposes is
the fair market value of those assets at the moment of death also finds support
in the courts. In United States v. Land,"'1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit established the presumptive date-of-death rule for valuation of
assets."' Judge Wisdom announced, "Brief as is the instant of death, the court
must pinpoint its valuation at this instant-the moment of truth, when the
ownership of the decedent ends and the ownership of the successors
begins." '253 The court's support of a strict date-of-death valuation rule hinged
on an analysis of the "willing buyer/willing seller" concept of fair market
value.2"4 Although Land involved a claim that the value of an asset prior to
death should control, other courts have adopted the rationale of that decision
seller cannot be expected to know on the valuation date events that have not yet occurred. Thus,
subsequent events are said not to be relevant as direct proof... of value on the all-important
valuation date.").
251. United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962). Land involved a dispute over
the valuation of the partnership interests of two decedents. Id. at 171. The partnership agree-
ment stipulated that if any partner withdrew from the partnership during his lifetime, the
partnership had the option of purchasing that interest at two-thirds value. Id. The agreement
further stipulated that upon the death of a partner, the partnership had the option to purchase
the decedent's interest at full value. Id. The respondent estates reported the value of the
decedents' interests at two-thirds value, asserting that the value of the interests prior to death
controlled for estate tax purposes. Id. The court rejected this theory, ruling that the date-of-
death value of the property controls for estate tax purposes, not the value prior or subsequent
to death. Id. at 172. The court based its ruling on the theory of fair market value, which
mandates analysis of the knowledge of the willing buyer and seller at the moment of valuation,
not at any time prior or subsequent to that valuation. Id. at 173.
252. See id. at 175 (ruling that date-of-death value of partnership interest controls for estate
tax purposes).
253. Id. at 172.
254. See id. at 173 (discussing conception of fair market value from viewpoint of "potential
buyer"). The court stated:
To find the fair market value of a property interest at the decedent's death we put
ourselves in the position of a potential purchaser of the interest at that time. Such
a person would not be influenced in his calculations by past risks that had failed to
materialize or by restrictions that had ended. Death tolls the bell for risks, contin-
gencies, or restrictions which exist only during the life of the decedent. A potential
buyer focuses on the value the property has in the present or will have in the future.
He attributes full value to any right that vests or matures at death, and he reduces
his valuation to account for any risk or deprivation that death brings into effect,
such as the effect of the death on the brains of a small, close corporation. These are
factors that would affect his enjoyment of the property should he purchase it, and
on which he bases his valuation. The sense of the situation suggests that we follow
suit.
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in foreclosing the consideration of events occurring subsequent to death in
determining asset valuation.2"
The fact that the courts and the legislature frown on the use of hindsight
in valuing assets for estate tax purposes seems logical in the context of the
fair-market-value doctrine. Unlike assets, however, courts do not value claims
based on a hypothetical arm's-length-bargaining transaction between a willing
buyer and a willing seller; the doctrine of fair market value is not applicable
in valuing a claim under § 2053(a)(3) of the code.256 This distinction lends
credence to the argument that subsequent events should play a role in valuing
deductions for claims against estates.257 Because the value of a claim does not
depend on the knowledge of the claimant and the estate at a particular point
in time, it is not unreasonable to use hindsight in determining the value of
deductions for such claims.
C. Section 2032-Alternate Valuation Date
The foregoing analysis exemplifies the strong policy arguments against
the use of hindsight in valuing assets, as well as the legislature's express
statutory mandate that the date of death governs timing for the computation
of asset values. Interestingly, however, Congress has carved out a limited
exception to this hard and fast rule, providing in § 2032 of the code for the
election of an alternate asset valuation date--six months after the date of
death-for purposes of computing the estate's tax liability.25 '
255. See Morris v. Comm'r, 761 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (6th Cir. 1985) (refusing to admit
evidence concerning lack of development of decedent's property eight years after date-of-death
valuation). Other courts have refused to consider events occurring subsequent to transfer in
determining asset valuation. See Lebowitz v. Comm'r, 917 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1990)
(refusing to consider events subsequent to purchase in determining whether nonrecourse debt
sufficiently reflected underlying property's fair market value); Ebben v. Comm'r, 783 F.2d 906,
909-10 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding valuation as of date of transfer and refusing to consider
property appraisal based primarily on events occurring subsequent to transfer). For a compre-
hensive list of decisions rejecting the use of hindsight in determining asset valuation for estate
tax purposes, see BOGDANSKI, supra note 163, 2.01 [3][c][i], at 2-60 n.23 1.
256. See I.R.C. § 2053(a) (2000) (containing no reference to fair market value with regard
to the valuation of estate deductions).
257. But see Meresidis, supra note 3, at 2717 ("The difference in treatment for claims and
assets seems to be a contradictory policy, since both are a part of the estate that is transferred
at death.").
258. See I.R.C. § 2032(a) (2000) (providing for election of alternate valuation date for
assets). This section states in full:
The value of the gross estate may be determined, if the executor so elects, by
valuing all the property included in the gross estate as follows: (1) In the case of
property distributed, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of, within 6 months
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The fact that Congress provides for an alternate postdeath valuation date
for assets (and a corresponding alternate determination of the value of marital
and charitable deductions) is of great relevance to the issue of valuing deduc-
tions for claims against estates. First, the fact that Congress carved out this
exception to the date-of-death valuation rule lends credence to the proposition
that postmortem events should play a role in valuation only if expressly autho-
rized by statute.2"9 This interpretation supports the argument that because
§ 2053(a)(3) doesnot contain a similar express statutory exception, postmor-
tem events should not play a role in valuing deductions for claims against
estates.2"° Second, it is arguable that a similar statutory scheme providing for
an alternative valuation date for deductions for claims against estates might be
an effective means of addressing the current conflict among the circuits.
2 61
Presently, there is no indication that the courts will reconcile their differences
of opinion in the near future. 262 Therefore, a statutory compromise in a vein
similar to § 2032 might ultimately be a more reasonable solution to this debate.
The first step in assessing the benefits of fashioning a statutory solution
to the debate over the valuation of § 2053(a)(3) deductions is to analyze the
public policy interests served by § 2032. The underlying purpose of § 2032(a)
is to shield the estate from tax liability on estate assets whose values decline
sharply as a result of market forces beyond the control of the estate during
administration. 263 However, an executor can only elect an alternate valuation
when the decline in value of the estate assets is not the result of a voluntary act
after the decedent's death such property shall be valued as of the date of distribu-
tion, sale, exchange, or other disposition. (2) In the case of property not distrib-
uted, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of, within 6 months after the dece-
dent's death such property shall be valued as of the date 6 months after the decc-
dent's death. (3) Any interest or estate which is affected by mere lapse of time shall
be included at its value as of the time of death (instead of the later date) with
adjustment for any difference in its value as of the later date not due to mere lapse
of time.
Id.
259. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (arguing that if Congress intends consider-
ation of postmortem events in valuation, it conveys this intent expressly by statute).
260. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (same).
261. See Raby & Raby, supra note 233, at 249-21, 18 (arguing that alternate valuation
election should apply to valuation of claims deductions as well as to valuation of assets).
262. See supra Part II (detailing circuit split); infra note 283 (discussing repeal of estate
tax, and observing that until Congress determines whether to make repeal permanent, resolution
of this issue may be elusive).
263. See 2 J. MARTIN BURKE ET AL., MODERN ESTATE PLANNING § 19.02 (2d ed. 2002)
("The alternate valuation election is provided solely to mitigate the hardship on an estate due
to declining market values."). Congress enacted § 2032 in 1935 in response to the dramatic and
rapid decline in property values during the Great Depression. Jones, supra note 174, at 677.
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on the part ofthe executor or other interested party.2" Thus, this provision acts
as an equitable protection against the unsavory prospect that an estate will have
to pay taxes on a high asset value determined on the date of death, even though
uncontrollable market forces have reduced the value of those assets drastically
in the months following death. Furthermore, § 2032(b) provides for a corre-
sponding alternate determination of the value of marital and charitable deduc-
tions that result from circumstances other than mere lapse of time or the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of a contingency.265 The code provides for an
alternate determination of the value of these deductions either as of the alter-
nate valuation date or as of the date of disposition of the underlying property,
whichever occurs first.2
The following illustration demonstrates the effect of a § 2032 election on
a charitable gift. John Doe devises to a charity real property valued at
$300,000 as of the date of his death. The executor of his estate elects the
alternate valuation date. A month after John's death, the executor transfers the
property to the charity, but the value of the property at the time of the transfer
is $400,000 as a result ofmarket conditions. Six months after John's death (the
alternate valuation date), the value of the property has increased even further,
to $500,000. Because the increase in the value was not due to a mere lapse of
time or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a contingency, the estate may
properly deduct $400,000.267 However, if the estate transferred the property to
the charity seven months after John's death, the proper deduction would have
been $500,000, the value of the property as of the alternate valuation date.26
264. See 2 BURKE Er AL., supra note 263, § 19.02 ("A voluntary postmortem act of a
surviving spouse, trustee or executor that results in a reduction of value is not to be considered
in determining the alternative value of the property.").
265. See I.R.C. § 2032(b) (2000) (governing treatment of charitable and marital deductions
under alternate valuation date election). This section states in part:
In case of an election made by the executor under this section, then-() for
purposes of the charitable deduction under section 2055 or 2106(aX2), any bequest,
legacy, devise, or transfer enumerated therein, and (2) for the purpose of the marital
deduction under section 2056, any interest in property passing to the surviving
spouse, shall be valued as of the date of the decedent's death with adjustment for
any difference in value (not due to mere lapse of time or the occurrence or nonoc-
currence of a contingency) of the property as of the date 6 months after the dece-
dent's death (substituting, in the case of property distributed by the executor or




267. See id. (providing for alternate valuation only if difference in value is "not due to mere
lapse of time or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a contingency").
268. See 2 BURKE ET AL., supra note 263, § 19.02 (offering similar illustration in which
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This illustration shows that pursuant to § 2032, postmortem events can affect
the valuation of deductions in limited circumstances. Although the statute does
not extend to deductions for claims, it does show that Congress is willing to
draft a rule recognizing the consideration of postmortem events in particular
situations.
Section 2032 is a reasonable and effective means of protecting the tax-
payer from the hardship of tax liabilities that do not truly reflect the value of
the assets underlying those liabilities, but at the same time it also serves the
government's interests. First, the statute does not apply to property burdened
with contingencies because contingencies decrease the value of the assets and
result in a lower valuation base for tax purposes.269 Second, the statute does
not apply in cases in which the value of the underlying property decreases by
reason of a mere lapse of time." In such cases, it is certain that the value of
the assets will decline after the date of death, and permitting an alternate
valuation election with regard to such property would undermine the estate
tax's underlying purpose: taxation of the estate as it exists at the moment of
death.2 ' Third, the statute does not apply in cases in which the change in value
of the underlying property is the result of a voluntary act on the part of the
executor, surviving spouse, or other interested party.2 This protects the
government from unmeritorious manipulation of the value of the estate's assets
after death as a means of reducing the value of the taxable estate under the rule.
Congress seems to have fashioned a reasonable compromise between
government and taxpayer interests in § 2032. The statute does not rely on a
bright-line date-of-death valuation principle, but neither does it extend post-
value of property increases after death).
269. See Jerry A. Kasner, IRS Makes a Close Call on the Alternate Valuation Date, 62 TAX
NoTEs 1313, 1314 (1994) ("The government has successfully contended that the property
should be valued free of the contingencies, since that produces a higher valuation.").
270. Examples of assets that decrease in value due to a mere lapse of time are patents,
annuities, reversions, and real property, when the decline is a result of depreciation. 2 BURKE
ET AL., supra note 263, § 19.04. In such cases, the date-of-death valuation, not the alternate
valuation, applies in computing the value of the assets. Id.
271. See Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1924) ("[The estate tax] is a tax upon
a transfer of his net estate by a decedent .... It comes into existence before and is independent
of the receipt of the property by the legatee. It taxes.. . 'not the interest to which some person
succeeds on a death, but the interest which ceased by reason of the death.'"); Propstra v. United
States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Because the estate tax is a tax on the privilege of
transferring property upon one's death, the property to be valued for estate tax purposes is that
which the decedent actually transfers at his death rather than the interest held by the decedent
before death or that held by the legatee after death.").
272. See 2 BURKE ET AL., supra note 263, § 19.02 ("A voluntary postmortem act of a
surviving spouse, trustee or executor that results in a reduction of value is not to be considered
in determining the alternative value of the property.").
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mortern valuation indefinitely into the future.273 Furthermore, the statute
recognizes the potential inequities involved in estate asset valuation by provid-
ing for postmortem review within reasonable temporal limitations.274
The statutory compromise reached in § 2032 serves important policy
interests, and a similar statutory solution governing § 2053(a)(3) might amelio-
rate the present disarray of the law with respect to deductions for claims. 275
However, there is an inherent problem in establishing a temporal limitations
period for the consideration of subsequent events in valuing deductions for
claims. Even if the legislature established a mandatory alternate valuation date
for valuing deductions for claims, there is potential for taxpayer abuse. 6
Taxpayers who are fairly certain of settling a claim for less than its date-of-
death value could simply prolong settlement negotiations beyond the statuto-
rily mandated alternate valuation date.27 Thus, the deduction for the claim
would not reflect the true amount paid to satisfy the claim, but rather, the
fictitious date-of-death value.
Nevertheless, some form of statutorily imposed temporal limitations
period on valuing deductions for claims would at the very least address the
underlying policy concern of avoiding uncertainty and delay in estate adminis-
trationY 8 Although fashioning a suitable statutory remedy to the dispute over
valuing deductions for claims is beyond the scope of this Note, consideration
of the legislature's establishment of an alternate valuation date under § 2032
with respect to the valuation of assets for estate tax purposes is arguably
relevant to the debate over the timing of valuation of deductions for claims
against estates, and should factor into the ultimate resolution of this issue.
V Conclusion
The dispute over the role of postmortem events in valuing deductions for
claims against estates is ripe for ultimate resolution, be it judicial or statutory.
273. See I.R.C. § 2032(a) (2000) (limiting alternate valuation date to six months after
decedent's death).
274. See 2 BURKE ET AL., supra note 263, § 19.02 (observing that purpose of alternate
valuation election is to mitigate hardships resulting from uncontrollable declines in market value
within a short period after decedent's death).
275. See Raby & Raby, supra note 233, at 249-21, 18 (arguing that alternate valuation
election should apply to valuation of claims deductions as well as to valuation of assets).
276. See Meresidis, supra note 3, at 2743 ("Even if there is a 'statute-of-limitations' period
during which claims may be valued up to a certain point after death, there will still arise the
danger of the estate purposefully settling a claim just beyond that period to avoid higher estate
tax duties.").
277. Id.
278. See supra note 174 (providing examples of courts and commentators critical of
uncertainty, delay, and inconsistency in estate administration).
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Two competing policy concerns underlie this debate. First, there is a strong
need for a solution that mitigates the uncertainty and delay in estate administra-
tion that is the product of the lack of statutory guidance as to the role of post-
mortem events in valuing deductions for claims.27 9 Second, there is also a need
for a solution that will protect against windfall awards to estates, but that at the
same time will preserve the interest of the legislature in encouraging certain
deductions.280
Fashioning a suitable remedy to this debate has thus far proved to be
difficult, at best, and with good reason. Issues of valuation are not fixed and
concrete, but rather are subjective and in constant flux." As Learned Hand
noted, "In the end value is no more than the opinions of those who have, and
those who have not, when they coincide. 2 2
The resolution of this issue necessarily must be the product of a reasoned
balancing of the public policy issues involved. If the concern for avoiding
uncertainty and delay in estate administration is the more pressing issue, then
a date-of-death valuation should prevail. However, if the overarching concern
is protecting against windfall awards to estates, then arguably postmortem
events should play a role in valuation. Thus far, the courts have not been able
to decide which policy concern should prevail, and Congress has chosen not
to intervene. Until the Supreme Court or the legislature weighs in on this issue,
the doctrinal disarray of the law in its present state will continue to confound
executors and the IRS alike and will continue to invite costly litigation over the
role of postmortem events in valuing deductions for claims against estates. 3
279. See supra note 174 (providing examples of courts and commentators critical of
uncertainty, delay, and inconsistency in estate administration).
280. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (suggesting that date-of-death valuation
results in windfalls to estates).
281. See Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155(1929) (noting that valuation
"depends upon the relative intensity of the social desire for it at that time"); John 0. Steinkamp,
Fair Market Value, Blockage, and the Valuation ofArt, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 335,340 (1994)
("The value of property is not static; it changes with time as economic conditions shift and
perceptions about the future change.").
282. Rice v. Eisner, 16 F.2d 358,361 (2d Cir. 1926).
283. It is important to note that Congress passed legislation in 2001 that provides for a total
repeal of the federal estate tax in 2010. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501(a), 115 Stat. 38, 69 (eliminating estate tax in 2010).
The Act gradually phases out the tax through 2009, id. § 511(a), 115 Stat. at 70-71, but unless
Congress extends the repeal beyond 2010, the estate tax will reemerge in its present form in
2011, see id. § 901, 115 Stat. at 150 (prescribing "sunset" provisions for estate tax repeal). As
a result of this repeal, it is not likely that the Supreme Court or Congress will take up the issue
of valuing deductions for claims until such time as the future of the estate tax is more certain.
